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In a modest attempt to help redress the lack of sensitivity exhibited by previous 
linguistic approaches to subtle differences in meaning in the use of English 
determiners, this paper presents an “embodied” reanalysis of determiner usage 
in English that takes into account what appear to be the “perceptual” 
underpinnings for differently nuanced scene construals signaled by the definite 
article and some other determiners. One central idea undergirding this 
programmatic effort is that use of different determiners reflects different 
“viewing arrangements” for the depicted scenes, whereby the speaker is 
covertly invoked as the “perceiving” self that impinges on such different 
construals. Four different viewing arrangements are suggested for four different 
groups of determiners and the “public” nature of the scene construal typically 
cued by the definite article is briefly discussed. 
 
 
One of the most elusive and rebarbative areas of grammar for learners of English as a 
second language is the article system, a small group of determiners that “sit” in the forefront 
position of noun phrases. Use of the definite article the and the indefinite article a(n) is so 
ubiquitous and extensive in the English language that second language learners cannot avoid 
making constant decisions as to when and where to use them in actual discourse and often end 
up making errors without knowing why. Many of them are chagrined about their inability to 
“crack” the system, lamenting that even small children learn to use the articles correctly and 
“why can’t I?” In fact, acquiring an adult-like system of article usage is no easy feat for 
English-speaking children, either. A more apposite question for learners to ask, then, seems to 
be: What makes it so hard for learners and even children in English-speaking cultures to learn 
the article system in the first place? 
Various theoretical and empirical attempts have been made to directly and indirectly 
answer this seemingly simple question. One broad consensus that has emerged over the years 
from such endeavors is that the kernel of the problem appears to consist in the speaker’s 
ability to assess the addressee’s knowledge state vis-à-vis intended referents (i.e. whether or 
not such referents are “definite,” or known to the addressee), as well as the issue of whether 
the speaker has existing, concrete representations of intended referents (i.e. whether such 
referents are “specific” or “nonspecific”). Yet, accounts of the article system based on these 
basic insights have fallen short of providing a panacea for learners of English and a truly 
effective method of teaching article usage still remains the Holy Grail of pedagogical 
grammar. The reason for this presumed failure, I submit, resides not so much in practitioners’ 
inability to translate the findings in article research into comprehensible instructional 
materials, but rather in the inadequacy of existing theories themselves, which are ill-equipped 
to capture subtle aspects of scene construal signaled by different uses of the articles. What is 
particularly missing is the recognition that nominal constructions determined by articles not 
only convey how we construe designated referents but also how we construe ourselves as 
conceptualizers, rather implicitly, in relation to those referents. This is an aspect of nominal 
reference that is especially difficult to grasp within the “objectivist” view of language 
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exemplified by traditional approaches to the article system. 
This short study is a modest attempt to help narrow this gap by exploring the possibility 
of positing a more “embodied” basis for the article system that has the potential of accounting 
for the subtler facets of scene construal in linguistic communication. More specifically, given 
the extensive role of perception in shaping human cognition and language abilities as it 
specifically relates to nominal reference phenomena, distinct “viewing arrangements” 
signaled by different determiners, including the definite article, are proposed as 
manifestations of the fundamentally complementary interaction between perception of the 
external world (exteroception) and self-perception (proprioception).  
 
 
Embodied Experience and Perceptual Basis of Meaning 
 
What is needed, to begin with, is an explicitly more embodied model of “scene” 
understanding in reference coordination to offer an experientially grounded explication of 
how the article system can be acquired and put to use in linguistic communication. Of 
particular relevance here are some notions articulated in ecological psychology (Gibson, 
1979; Honda, 2005) and their interface with Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 
1996, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008), a rigorously constructed theory of language situated within 
the broader paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics that accounts for human linguistic capacities 
primarily on the basis of general human perceptual and cognitive abilities. 
 
Ecological Psychology and Cognitive Grammar 
 
Linguistic forms often impart information that is not explicitly encoded in the language 
itself. The definite article the designates a schematic thing, but it also indicates, covertly, how 
the depicted entity is situated with regard to the ground—a process called "grounding" in 
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2002, 2004, 2008)—whereby the ground is constituted by the 
speaker, the listener(s), and their immediate surroundings. In prototypical cases, it tacitly 
signals that the speaker believes that the listener can establish mental contact with the 
designated entity, but this conceptual configuration (a triangulation of sort), does not 
explicitly figure at all in language. The definite article the, however, does tell the interlocutors 
that the depicted conceptual scene has to be experienced in a certain way from a certain 
perspective (Langacker 2004). These basic insights in Cognitive Grammar about subjective 
(hence often implicit) aspects of meaning construction that arise ultimately from our 
embodied experience have recognizable affinities with many of the findings about human 
perception within the framework of ecological psychology, one of whose founders is James J. 
Gibson. Gibson (1979) claims that perceiving the self is an inevitable counterpart of 
perceiving the environment. My basic contention here is that Gibson’s insight is relevant to 
the question of how the “ground” (the speech event and its participants – and their “selves”) is 
construed in linguistic conceptualization of various scenes, and hence the issue of definiteness. 
Although my observations are necessarily programmatic and thus lack direct empirical 
support, I argue that new perspectives derived from ecological psychology shed revealing 
light upon some of the less understood aspects of definiteness phenomena and the English 
article system.  
 
Perceiving the Environment and Perceiving the Self 
 
Perception of the environment surely gives us rich information about entities in the 
external world. At the same time, however, such ecological perception also entails 
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co-perception of the “self” and thus reveals oft-hidden facets of own subjective experience. For 
instance, Lee and Aronson (1974), in a famous “moving room” experiment, showed that 
external visual information may affect the posture of infants who have much less sophisticated 
inferential abilities than adults. In this experiment, babies who had just recently learned to stand 
were tested on a motionless floor, within a movable room. The infants faced the interior end 
wall, and the whole structure, except the floor, was moved so that the end wall approached or 
receded. Interestingly, the infants compensated for a nonexistent loss of balance signaled by the 
optic flow pattern and fell in the direction of the optic flow. If the end wall moved slightly away 
from the baby, the infant fell forward, and if the wall moved slightly toward the baby, the infant 
fell over backward. This shows that the infants’ coperceived changes in their own position 
when visually perceiving the movement of the wall, and fell down as a result of their knee-jerk 
attempt to adjust their postural position accordingly. In other words, perceptual information 
about the external world (i.e. extroception) affected their postural behavior (i.e.  
proprioception).  The kind of spontaneous postural adjustment exhibited in this experiment 
despite no change or external force to one’s own body further attests to the fundamentally 
multimodal (and thus redundant) nature of human perception and cognition (Gibbs, 2006). 
The following drawing is an updating of Ernst Mach’s work in the 1880s entitled “The 
Visual Ego,” and shows a cross-section of the field of view of the left orbit of a human observer. 
Notice that the drawing depicts an “objective” scene viewed by a particular observer 
(extroception), but it also reveals where the perceiving ego is located and the vantage point 
from which the ego is perceiving the scene with a particular orientation (proprioception). In that 
sense, it is possible to see this as a kind of “self-portrait.”  
 
Likewise, language often signals this sort of complementarity between perception of the 
“objective” external world and self-perception. Consider the following examples. 
 
(1) a. John disappeared from the room, muttering something. 
   b. John emerged from the room, muttering something.  
 
These sentences describe John’s “objective” behavior as seen from the speaker’s perspective, 
and no explicit information about the speaker’s location is linguistically encoded. However, 
they clearly reveal where the speaker (the ego) is located with respect to the room. In (1a), the 
speaker is believed to be inside the room, watching John go out, while in (1b) the speaker is 
believed to be outside of the room, watching John come out. Verbs like disappear and emerge 
thus signal not only the visual perception of an external entity’s movement but also the 
speaker’s relationship to the entity and his subjective experience of the depicted scene as well. 
Figure 1. A“self-portrait” adapted from Mach (Gibson 1979, p. 11) 
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In that sense, they are fundamentally “deictic” in nature, as are verbs like come and go and 
grounding elements like demonstratives and the definite article. It is worth remembering here 
that the definite article the evokes the ground as the implicit deictic center for interpreting the 
intended referent. Consider another example slightly modified from Talmy (2000, p. 68). 
 
(2) She sat in the rocker near her bed and looked out the window. How lovely the 
flowers were! 
 
Talmy gives the following explanation for this mini-narrative: 
 
In the first sentence, the use of a third-person pronoun together with the objective 
scene description invites the listener to place his perspective point somewhere in the 
depicted room looking at the sitting woman. But in the second sentence, the 
exclamatory how-construction, together with the expression of subjective experience, 
induces the listener to relocate his perspective point to the location of the sitting 
woman, in effect, looking out through her eyes. (Talmy, 2000, pp. 68-69) 
 
It is indisputable that the exclamatory how-construction is the primary factor in inviting this 
perspective point shift. However, I would argue that the use of the definite article in the 
flowers is also a crucial contributing factor that allows the listener to “experience” vicariously 
the subjective perception of the depicted scene by the sitting woman in the room, thereby 
revealing a “proprioceptive” facet of the surrogate ground (i.e. the woman in the room). 
With respect to the relationship between perception of the environment and 
self-perception, ecological psychology thus makes the following basic observations: 
 
1.  Change in the field of view or change in how things look reveals change in one’s 
own location or one’s own state. 
2.  A stationary field of view or no change in how things look reveals one’s stationary 
location in the immediate environment.  
3.  How events look reveals how one’s agency might be involved in such events 
(Honda, 2005, p. 16) 
 
Given these basic observations and the central tenets of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008), 
it is not entirely unreasonable to suppose that ways in which the conceptualizer views the “field 
of view” will have profound implications for language use, in particular, how “grounding” 
(Langacker, 1991, 2004) manifests itself, as will be examined later. 
 
Kinds of Self and the “Zero Form” Principle 
 
In explicating the role of the perceiving self in ecological and interpersonal perception, 
Neisser (1988) proposed five kinds of self-knowledge that pertain to different facets of how 
one perceives oneself: 
 
(3) Five kinds of self-knowledge (Neisser, 1988, p. 38) 
 
The ecological self is the self as perceived with respect to the physical 
environment. 
The interpersonal self, which appears from earliest infancy as the ecological self 
does, is specified by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and 
communication with conspecifics.  
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The extended self is based primarily on our personal memories and 
anticipations. 
The private self appears when children first notice that some of their 
experiences are not directly shared with other people.  
The conceptual self, or “self-concept,” draws its meaning from the network 
assumptions and theories in which it is embedded, just as all other concepts do. 
 
Of these kinds of self-knowledge, the ecological self and the interpersonal self are particularly 
deemed important in investigating linguistic manifestations of perceptual information (Honda, 
2005). The kind of self perception we examined in the previous section pertains mostly to the 
ecological self, which is the self as directly perceived vis-à-vis the immediate physical 
environment. Consider the following example. 
 
(4) Kyoto is approaching. (Honda, 2005, p.26) 
  
Here, the city of Kyoto is an immovable geographical expanse. The sentence, however, is 
depicting a dynamically changing scene as seen by the ecological self (of the speaker by 
default but it could be the ecological self of some protagonist in a story or the collective self 
of both speaker and hearer (“us”)). Notice that the ecological self is not expressed explicitly in 
the sentence but its existence is prerequisite for understanding the depicted scene. A similar 
observation can be made in linguistic phenomena related to what is widely known in 
Cognitive Linguistics as “fictive motion” or “subjective scene” (Talmy, 2000; Langacker 
1987; Matsumoto, 1996).  
 
(5) There is a house every now and then through the valley. (Langacker, 1991, p. 
501) 
 
In this example, there are clearly multiple houses in the depicted scene, but the singular form 
a house is used. This is because the sentence “presupposes a viewer in motion through the 
valley who reports on the scene that appears within the immediate viewing frame as the 
journey progresses” (Langacker, 1991, p. 501). In other words, this is a report of a 
dynamically evolving scene being captured within the field of view of the moving ecological 
self, who remains “offstage.” 
The interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals 
of rapport and communication. The interpersonal self pertains most saliently to various 
politeness phenomena, where different linguistic forms are employed to convey one’s 
intended meaning. 
 
(6) a. It’s such an honor to meet you, Professor Einstein. (from a student to a 
professor). 
   b. Hey, Albert! (as a close friend) 
   c. ?It’s such an honor to meet you, Ms. Smith. (an adult talking to a 3-year-old) 
     
Again, the interpersonal self receives no explicit linguistic expression here and yet the 
linguistic forms employed reflect how the interpersonal self is construed with respect to the 
addressees in these situations. According to Neisser (1988), the ecological self and the 
interpersonal self appear very early in infancy (at least from 3 months old) and they are 
believed to be integrated into what Honda (2005) calls the “directly-perceived self” at around 
age one. I will refer to this kind of integrated self-knowledge as the “perceptual self” because 
it is fundamentally based on perceptually available information, of both an ecological and an 
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interpersonal nature. In connection with the relationship between the ecological self and the 
interpersonal self, Neisser (1988, p. 46) points out: “Awareness of the interpersonal self is 
almost invariably accompanied by a simultaneous awareness of the ecological self. A wealth 
of information specifies their co-existence: I can see that the person to whom you are 
addressing yourself (the interpersonal me) is the very person who is located here, at this point 
of observation in this environment (the ecological me).” 
These examples point to the existence of a perceptually based principle in language use, 
which I will call the “Zero Form” Principle (adapted from Honda, 2005, pp. 25-26): In language, 
only those elements that are within the field of conceptualization (parallel to the field of view, 
and essentially equivalent to Langacker’s notion of “immediate scope” or “onstage” region) can 
receive phonological form. By default, the perceptual (ecological + interpersonal) self is not 
within the field of conceptualization (just as the viewing ego is at the extreme margins of his 
own field of view) and thus does not receive phonological form (i.e. has “zero” forms). Fictive 
motion phenomena, therefore, can be reanalyzed as manifestations of the Zero Form Principle. 
This does not mean, however, that everything that is related to implicit information not 
explicitly encoded in language pertains to the perceptual self. Furthermore, a facet of the 
perceptual self can go “onstage” and receive phonological form in “displaced self” situations, 
most notably in the use of first-person pronouns I and we and their inflected forms. 
 
 
Viewing Arrangements and Determiners: An Ecological Reanalysis 
 
The inseparable relationship between perception of the environment and self-perception 
outlined above has profound implications for linguistic theories that acknowledge 
fundamental parallels between perception and cognition. As a basic observation, specific 
cognitive underpinnings can be posited for certain “viewing arrangements” within the 
framework of Cognitive Grammar to capture how linguistic expressions signal different ways 
in which the conceptualizer is “viewing” the evoked conceptual scene. These different 
viewing arrangements pertain to two different modes of recall in episodic memory proposed 
by Nigro and Neisser (1983). In observation memory the perceptual self recalls the scene in the 
past from a third-person point of view, while in field memory the perceptual self recalls the 
scene as experienced by himself. Observer memory corresponds to Viewing Arrangement 1 
(“Offstage” Subjective Self) and Viewing Arrangement 2 (“Displaced” Self) sketched below, 
whereas field memory corresponds to Viewing Arrangement 3 (“Participatory” Subjective 
Self). These distinct viewing arrangements are explained in the following subsections. 
 
Viewing Arrangement 1: “Offstage” Subjective Self 
 
This is the most basic and “neutral” viewing arrangement, in which the perceptual self in the 
ground remains offstage as the subject of conception. In line with the Zero Form Principle, the 
self (me) receives no phonological form. Figure 1 schematically shows the viewing 
arrangement for the following sentence, along with its cognitive content. 
 
(7) Vanessa is sitting across the table from John. 
 
In this viewing arrangement, the depicted scene is construed with a high degree of objectivity, 
with the focus of attention almost exclusively falling upon the entities and their relationship in 
the onstage region. In other words, the relationship between Vanessa and John is conceived as 
something external to the conceptualizer in the ground, and in that sense, the conceptualizer is 
viewing the relationship from an “offstage” third-person point of view (hence, observer 
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memory). I therefore call the self perception mode in this viewing arrangement “the offstage 
subjective self”. 
 
Figure 2. Viewing Arrangement 1: “Offstage” Subjective Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Vanessa is sitting across the table from John”. 
 
Viewing Arrangement 2: “Displaced” Self 
 
In this arrangement, a facet of the perceptual self goes onstage as a participant in the depicted 
event, although the self itself remains offstage as the viewing ego. It is exemplified in the 
following sentence. 
 
(8) Vanessa is sitting across the table from me. 
 
The onstage portion of the self is thus “displaced” and construed “objectively,” on a par with 
other referents, and receives phonological form (me) in line with the Zero Form Principle. This 
is the basic viewing arrangement for first-person references. I call the self perception mode here 
“the displaced self.” 
Figure 3. Viewing Arrangement 2: “Displaced” Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Vanessa is sitting across the table from me” 
 
 
 
 
John Vanessa 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
 
 
Vanessa “ME” 
G 
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Viewing Arrangement 3: “Participatory” Subjective Self 
 
The next category of viewing arrangement is exemplified by sentence (9). 
 
(9) Vanessa is sitting across the table. 
 
In this viewing arrangement (under the interpretation that the speaker is sitting across 
the table from Vanessa), the perceptual self is at the margin of the onstage region and has 
awareness that it participates in the depicted scene as an implicit or “understood” reference 
point. Since the self remains implicit, despite its awareness of being “in the scene,” it is not 
explicitly expressed, based on the Zero Form Principle. I call the self perception mode in this 
arrangement “the participatory subjective self,” reflecting the conceptualizer’s role as an 
implicit participant in the evoked scene. 
 
Figure 4. Viewing Arrangement 3: “Participatory” Subjective Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Vanessa is sitting across the table.” 
 
“Expanded Ground” for Use of the Definite Article 
 
Now that we have laid out the basic viewing arrangements for the three different modes 
of self perception, of paramount interest for us now is to contemplate how these differences 
may relate to different types of determiners as grounding elements. My working hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
(10) Types of determiners and their default viewing arrangements:  
Viewing Arrangement 1 [the “offstage” subjective self] 
- possessives, except first-person (and possibly, second-person) possessives 
Viewing Arrangement 2 [the displaced self] 
- first-person (and possibly, second-person) possessives (as a facet of the ground 
is put onstage for objective construal) 
Viewing Arrangement 3 [the “participatory” subjective self] 
- demonstratives (with the ground serving as implicit reference point) 
 
Possessive constructions (except first-person and second-person possessives) invoke an 
 
 
G 
Vanessa 
 
 
 
Viewing Arrangements and the Perceiving Self 
9 
 
entity in the onstage region as a salient reference point from which to access the target 
nominal referent (see Section 3.1.4.3). In Mary’s boyfriend, for instance, Mary is picked out 
as a contextually salient reference point to locate the individual identified as her boyfriend. In 
these conceptions of nominals, the perceptual self remains offstage (hence, Viewing 
Arrangement 1). In first-person and second-person possessives (i.e. my, your, our), on the 
other hand, a facet of the ground is necessarily put onstage to receive an objective construal as 
the “displaced” self (hence, Viewing Arrangement 2). In the case of demonstratives, the 
ground is obligatorily implicated as a crucial reference point (or the deictic center) for 
locating the intended referent in an area either proximal or distal to the ground. Despite its 
critical role in the entire conception of the designated referent, the ground itself remains 
offstage and receives a very subjective construal, although there is a clear sense in which a 
facet of the conceptualizer in the ground is “in the scene” as the source of the directive force 
of pointing signaled by such demonstratives (hence, Viewing Arrangement 3). The remaining 
question is how we can characterize the viewing arrangement signaled by the definite article, 
as exemplified by the following sentence. 
 
(11) The president is sitting across the table from Hillary. 
 
Since the definite article the is widely believed to have developed historically from the 
precursor of the distal demonstrative that (e.g. Spamer 1979), the viewing arrangement 
through which the definite article is construed seems to be closest to Viewing Arrangement 3, 
with the ground serving as implicit reference point for locating the intended referent (i.e. the 
speaker and hearer in the offstage region coordinate “mental contact” with the same referent). 
However, in construing the-marked nominal predications, the implicit reference point invoked 
seems to go beyond the immediate participants (speaker and hearer). In almost all cases, 
adequate understanding of the-marked definite descriptions presupposes a rich archive of 
patterned knowledge structures (“frames,” “ICMs,” discourse conventions, etc.) sufficiently 
shared by members of the same speech community. 
This suggests that the viewing arrangement evoked by the seems to involve an extension 
of what Laury (2002) calls “the sociocentric ground” (i.e. a contextual reference point 
dynamically constructed by the speech participants), in the sense that other members of the 
speech community are also intimated in the offstage background as co-conceptualizers. 
Without the (even rudimentary) awareness that culturally entrenched frames and cognitive 
models are shared by members of the same speech community and are equally available to the 
speech participants, it would be difficult to coordinate mental contact with the referent 
designated by a given definite description marked by the. Children’s difficulty with learning 
the definite article may stem, at least partly, from this special viewing arrangement (while 
other factors would likely include a long time period needed to acquire sufficient 
encyclopedic knowledge base prerequisite for understanding cultural frames, as well as the 
difficulty in assessing others’ knowledge states, as will be discussed below). I therefore 
propose the following viewing arrangement for the definite article the.  
To sum up, the ground remains offstage and thus receives “zero” form in default 
situations. Yet grounding predications (i.e. articles, demonstratives, possessives, etc.) signal 
how the intended referents are related to the ground in given scenes with particular viewing 
arrangements. Demonstratives like this and that put onstage their directive force of pointing 
(by the conceptualizer), while keeping the ground itself offstage [Viewing Arrangement 3]. 
Some semblance of the ground (the conceptualizer) goes onstage as the source of the directive 
force. On the other hand, the definite article, with its fully attenuated directive force, keeps the 
ground fully offstage, i.e. construes the ground with a higher degree of subjectivity, since no 
pointing is coming from the conceptualizer (thus no phonological contrast between proximal 
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and distal). Further, the perceptual self (and its peer viewer) are dimly aware of other 
co-conceptualizers constituting an extended sociocentral ground, which gives access to 
contextually salient cognitive and cultural frames. From the standpoint of ecological 
psychology, this viewing arrangement for the definite article entails the availability of a 
“public” viewpoint potentially available to all members of the speech community if put in that 
particular context. 
 
Figure 5. Viewing Arrangement 4: Expanded Ground 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The president is sitting across the table from Hillary.” 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The “embodied” characterization of the definite article and other determiners presented 
above remains programmatic and largely speculative, and further research is clearly needed to 
establish a fuller, more unified theory of the English article system. Nevertheless, a growing 
body of research on the central role of subjective, sensorimotor experiences in shaping human 
cognition and language (e.g. Gibbs, 2006; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Mandler, 2004, 2010; 
Ziemke et al. 2007) seems to offer indications that the basic assumptions undergirding the 
present research are empirically and theoretically justifiable. Particularly exciting is the 
possible involvement of embodied “simulations” (Barsalou, 1999; Bergen, 2007; Ritchie, 
2006; Zwaan, 2004) and a simulation-based model of the use of articles derived from those 
insights may offer a viable alternative perspective that coherently addresses many of the gaps, 
inconsistencies, and oversights of contemporary understanding of article usage in English. 
 
G 
 
 
 
Hillary President 
 
 
 G’ =Expanded 
Socio-centric 
Ground 
Viewing Scope 
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